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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant James C. Beckett was found guilty of two 
counts each of robbery and armed robbery, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 2113(a) & (d), and then sentenced by the 
District Court. Because Beckett's trial counsel failed to file 
a timely notice of appeal on his behalf, the District Court 
agreed to re-sentence him so he could file a notice of 
appeal. 
 
Becket now argues that the District Court erred by (1) 
determining that he was a career offender; (2) failing to 
provide him with his rights of allocution; (3) imposing 
restitution without determining his ability to pay, and 
delegating the restitution issue to the Bureau of Corrections 
to be dealt with at a later date; (4) sentencing him on both 
charges of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d), 
and robbery under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a); (5) permitting 
ineffective assistance of counsel and allowing reversible 
error to go uncorrected, when the Assistant United States 
Attorney referred to Beckett as a "repeat offender" at trial 
and Beckett's counsel did not object; (6) giving the jury an 
erroneous and confusing instruction; (7) violating his 
speedy trial rights; (8) allowing the guilty verdicts on the 
charges of robbery and bank robbery to stand when they 
were not supported by the evidence; and (9) allowing the 
guilty verdict to 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d) to stand when it was 
not supported by the evidence. 
 
The government admits that the District Court erred by 
failing to make specific findings of fact concerning Beckett's 
ability to pay restitution, and by sentencing Beckett for 
both his convictions for armed bank robbery, and the lesser 
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included offense of bank robbery. We will reverse and 
remand for factual findings on the question of Beckett's 
ability to pay restitution. We will vacate the sentence 
imposed for the lesser included offenses of bank robbery, 
charged in Counts One and Three of indictment of March 





In June, 1990, a man entered the Home Unity Bank 
branch located in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. He placed a box 
on the counter before teller Bea Ludwig. This box had an 
antenna and a lighted button on it. A co-worker, Cassandra 
Waters, saw the man place the box on the counter. She 
described him as wearing glasses, and an out of style, 
uncoordinated suit that caught her attention. She 
estimated that he was between 5'6" and 5'7" tall. Another 
bank employee, Anne McCauley, noticed that the man was 
wearing surgical gloves. 
 
The man handed Ludwig a note that stated: 
 
       Stay calm. Say nothing. Do not look around nor at me 
       and nothing will happen. Highly-sophisticated remote 
       control bomb receiver facing you. I have a transmitter 
       in my pocket with a gun. Put all of the money in a 
       brown envelope with this note. No red dye. Do not be 
       a fool. Hurry. Wait two minutes after we leave before 
       moving. 
 
Ludwig gave the man all of the money in her drawer, 
$1,093. The man left the box on the counter, and exited the 
bank. Ludwig then told a co-worker that she had been 
robbed, and began to cry. Ludwig and the other people in 
the bank retreated into the vault, and then to a neighboring 
building to escape what they thought was a bomb. 
 
The Bomb Squad used a robot to remove the box from 
the Home Unity Bank. The robot carried the suspected 
bomb outside to the parking lot, and broke it apart with a 
single shotgun shell. The police then gathered all the debris 
from the bomb as evidence, including a piece of antenna. 
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Cassandra Waters later picked Beckett's photograph out 
of a photographic line-up, and also identified Beckett as the 
robber from the witness stand at trial. 
 
At the time of this robbery, Beckett lived with his wife, 
Patricia Fuller, and a son, at the Creekside Apartments on 
Knights Road in Bensalem, a short distance from the Home 
Unity Branch that was robbed. The day after the robbery 
Beckett paid $475 in cash for a 1980 blue Ford Granada. 
 
Three months later, a man wearing glasses, a tie, and a 
trench coat entered the Bensalem branch of Fidelity Bank. 
He approached teller Maria Sanchez. She described him as 
approximately 5'4"  tall. The man handed Sanchez a note 
and an envelope. The note instructed her not to look 
around. It explained that there was a bomb which had been 
activated. It warned her not to place a dye pack with the 
money. Sanchez gave the man all the money she had, 
including a night deposit she had been working on, totaling 
$9,988. 
 
Coincidently, a local resident was out for a walk near the 
Fidelity Bank and saw a man wearing a trench coat run by. 
The man was trying to get his right arm out of the coat 
without using his left hand, as though he was holding 
something with his left hand. The man then got into a blue 
car, spun his wheels, and drove away. 
 
When the police arrived, a teller reported that the robber 
had used a bomb. A detective noticed a shoe box with 
wrapping paper around it near one of the teller windows. 
The detective evacuated the customers and employees, 
sealed off the area, and called the Philadelphia Bomb 
Disposal Unit. The Bomb Squad used a robot to remove the 
box and transport it to a remote area of the parking lot. It 
then shot the box with compressed air and water. 
Detectives collected the debris from the hoax bomb, 
including gift wrapping paper and the business section 
from the September 9, 1990 edition of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer. A detective located gift wrapping paper that was 
identical to that used in the hoax bomb from the Fidelity 
Bank robbery in a Pathmark store just opposite Beckett's 
Creekside apartment. 
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On the day of the Fidelity Bank robbery, Beckett traded 
in his blue Granada and paid $3,320 in cash for a 1986 
Buick Electra. An employee from the used car dealership 
that sold Beckett the Buick found a glove in the back seat 
of the Ford Granada that Beckett had traded in. An FBI 
agent later recovered a brown bag from behind the front 
seat that contained a broken pair of eyeglasses. 
 
Also on the same day, Beckett paid $1,300 to rent a new 
apartment at 10103 Northeast Avenue in Philadelphia. The 
next day, he paid $210.94 in cash for a TV. On the 
following day, he paid $2,314.97 in cash for furniture, a 
VCR, a stereo, and telephones. These expenditures totaled 
$7,145.91. 
 
His girlfriend, Debra McCole, testified that she dated 
Beckett during the summer and fall of 1990. Beckett told 
her that he had rented the apartment at 10103 Northeast 
Avenue for her, and that he was going to furnish it for her, 
her son, and the baby she was expecting. He took her to 
see it after he bought his new car. He also gave McCole 
between $50 and $100. McCole identified the gift wrapping 
paper located by detectives at the Pathmark store, and 
identical to that used in the hoax bomb, as the same gift 
wrapping paper she had used for her son's birthday on 
September 30, 1990, the day before the Fidelity Bank 
robbery. 
 
Beckett's wife, Patricia Fuller, told an FBI agent that she 
had never seen any pay stubs for Beckett around the 
house, and had not seen him with any cash. In the spring 
of 1989, Beckett told her that he was paying the rent. In 
fact, he had not, and they were almost evicted. Fuller took 
responsibility for the rent, telephone, and utilities in the 
summer of 1989. Beckett did not provide money towards 
these bills, although he did promise Fuller he would move 
her and her son to a new apartment at 10103 Northeast 
Avenue. 
 Police went to Beckett's new 10103 Northeast Avenue 
address on October 8, 1990. They found a sock containing 
$60 behind a vent on the second floor. Later that day, 
police went to Beckett's old apartment at Creekside and 
recovered a trench coat from the living room closet that 
belonged to him. 
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Detective Robert Schutter interviewed Beckett at his 
Creekside apartment. Beckett stated that he worked for a 
carpet installer named Joe Regan, earned $80 a day, was 
paid by check, but had not worked for two or three weeks. 
Detective Schutter found small pieces of a broken silver 
metallic antenna in a closet, and a September 9, 1990 
edition of the Philadelphia Inquirer that had only one page 
from the Business Section. Joe Regan later testified that 
Beckett had worked for him last in September of 1989, not 
September of 1990 as Beckett had represented to the 
police. 
 
Although Beckett was arrested by local authorities for the 
Fidelity Bank robbery, the evidence was presented to a 
federal grand jury, which returned a four-count indictment 
against Beckett. Counts One and Two charged robbery and 
armed robbery of the Home Unity Savings Bank in 
Bensalem, Pennsylvania. Counts Three and Four charged 
robbery and armed robbery of the Fidelity Bank in 
Bensalem, Pennsylvania. The armed robbery charges in 
Counts Two and Four stemmed from Beckett's use of the 
hoax bombs to secure monies from the tellers. Beckett filed 
a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, on the basis of the 
delay between his state arrest and his federal indictment, 
which the District Court denied. 
 
At trial, an FBI fingerprint specialist testified that she 
had identified one of Beckett's fingerprints on the 
newspaper recovered from the hoax bomb used in the 
Fidelity Bank robbery. 
 
An FBI bomb expert examined the remnants of the hoax 
bombs and opined at trial that they were built either by the 
same person, or by persons having intimate knowledge of 
one another's activities. The expert noted that (1) both 
devices used a small cardboard box as a container; (2) both 
boxes were reinforced with 3/4 inch masking tape that was 
manufactured with the same paper; (3) both devices lacked 
a dummy explosive charge, meaning that there was no 
simulated switch or simulated explosive that represented a 
popular concept of what explosives looked like, such as 
flares, modeling clay, or PVC pipe; and (4) both devices 
were gift wrapped, an "extremely unusual" characteristic. 
The agent testified that the FBI laboratory reviews 
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approximately 70 hoax bombs a year, and since 1983, only 
one other was gift wrapped. 
 
At the close of the trial, counsel moved for a directed 
verdict of acquittal on the ground that the evidence failed to 
establish the elements of aggravated robbery under 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(d). This section provides for a maximum five 
year sentencing enhancement if the defendant either 
assaulted any person or put their life in jeopardy by use of 
a dangerous weapon. The District Court granted this 
motion to the extent that the government intended to 
proceed on the "jeopardy" prong of Section 2113(d), but 
denied the motion as to the "assault" prong. The District 
Court then instructed the jury on the elements of both 
bank robbery and assault during the course of bank 
robbery by use of a dangerous weapon. 
 
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. At the 
sentencing hearing, the District Court heard arguments on 
the question of whether the career offender provisions of 
the Sentencing Guidelines applied in light of Beckett's two 
prior convictions for bank robbery in 1982. The District 
Court found that the two prior convictions were not part of 
a single common plan or scheme, and that the career 
offender provisions applied. 
 
The District Court provided Beckett with the right of 
allocution at the first sentencing hearing. Beckett 
addressed the court, asserted his innocence, and argued 
the evidence from trial. 
 
The District Court sentenced Beckett to 262 months of 
imprisonment on Counts Two and Four -- the armed 
robbery counts -- and to concurrent terms of 240 months 
each on Counts One and Three, the statutory maximum 
sentence for the lesser included offenses of bank robbery. 
The District Court also directed the Bureau of Prisons to 
calculate Beckett's release date using the date he was first 
taken into state custody under a state arrest warrant, six 
months before his federal arrest. 
 
The District Court also ordered that Beckett make 
restitution in the amount of $9,988 to Fidelity Bank and 
$1,093 to Home Unity Bank, for a total of $11,081 to be 
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paid on a schedule that would be established by the 
probation office. 
 
Beckett filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255, 
requesting that the District Court vacate his sentence 
because his counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. The 
District Court appointed new counsel, granted Beckett's 
motion, and scheduled a re-sentencing so that Beckett 
could file a timely appeal from that hearing. 
 
At the second sentencing, newly appointed counsel again 
raised the question of whether the career offender 
provisions applied, and argued that the sentencing court 
could depart downward even if those provisions did apply. 
Beckett testified regarding his planning of the two 1982 
robberies. The District Court found Beckett not credible, 
held that the career offender provisions applied, and 
reaffirmed its prior ruling that the guidelines range was 
262-327 months. The District Court then departed 
downward because the career offender provisions 
overstated the defendant's criminal history and risk of 
recidivism, and imposed concurrent sentences of 180 
months on all counts. The District Court also reiterated its 
instruction to the Bureau of Prisons that the date of 
Beckett's state arrest shall be used to calculate his release 
date. 
 
Finally, the District Court reinstated the restitution 
order, but did not make findings of fact regarding the 
defendant's ability to pay, reasoning that it could adjust the 






Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines directs the 
sentencing court to impose enhanced terms of 
imprisonment upon defendants who have been convicted of 
violent or controlled substances offenses, and who 
previously incurred two or more felony convictions for 
either crimes of violence or drug trafficking. Beckett argues 
that the District Court erred by declaring him a career 
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offender, claiming that his two prior bank robbery 
convictions were part of a common scheme.1  Therefore, he 
argues, they should have been counted as a single prior 
conviction, and the career offender enhancement should 
not have been applied to him. 
 
Section 4B1.2(c)(2) states that to be counted towards 
Section 4B1.1's requirement of two prior felony convictions, 
each prior felony conviction must be separate from any 
other prior convictions. Section 4A1.2(a)(2) provides that 
"[p]rior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be 
counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related 
cases are to be treated as one sentence." Therefore, if a 
defendant has two prior felony convictions, but they stem 
from related cases, they are treated as a single conviction 
for purposes of applying the career offender enhancement 
of Section 4B1.1. 
 
The question is when do two felony convictions stem from 
"related" cases. Application Note 3 to Section 4A1.2 
explains: 
 
       Prior sentences are not considered related if they were 
       for offenses that were separated by an intervening 
       arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first 
       offense prior to committing the second offense). 
       Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if 
       they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the 
       same occasion, (B) were part of a single common 
       scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or 
       sentencing. 
 
Beckett's convictions stemmed from (1) the robbery of the 
Western Savings Bank; and (2) the robbery of the Benjamin 
Franklin Federal Savings and Loan. Beckett was arrested 
on April 2, 1982 for both robberies. Beckett's two prior 
convictions for bank robbery were thus not separated by an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Beckett also challenges his career offender status on the ground that 
his guilty plea colloquy to one of his prior convictions was defective. 
However, Beckett failed to raise this argument below or in any collateral 
attack on that judgment. He has therefore waived that argument. See 
Curtis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) (defendant must 
challenge prior conviction in separate collateral proceeding). 
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intervening arrest. However, they did not result from 
offenses that occurred on the same occasion, nor from 
offenses that were consolidated for trial or sentencing. He 
was charged by separate federal indictments, the cases 
were assigned to different federal judges, and the 
proceedings were never consolidated. 
 
The only question is whether they were part of a single 
common scheme or plan. The Guidelines do not define this 
term, nor have we addressed the issue.2  However, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has, 
and it held that the terms " `scheme' and`plan' are words of 
intention, implying that [the two offenses] have been jointly 
planned, or at least that it would have been evident that 
the commission of one would entail the commission of the 
other as well." United States v. Ali, 951 F.2d 827, 828 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has held that two prior attempted robbery 
convictions were not related when they occurred four days 
apart, at different locations, and had separate victims. See 
United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 894 (2d Cir. 1995). The 
Court there rejected the defendant's arguments that 
because the robberies were part of a "robbery spree," the 
"two crimes had robbery as their common purpose." Id. The 
court stressed that temporal proximity does not suffice to 
show the "close factual relationship" between the two 
crimes that is needed to prove "relatedness." Id. 
 
Once the government has established the existence of two 
prior violent or drug convictions, the burden for 
establishing that the prior convictions were part of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Beckett argues that the Sentencing Guidelines do define "common 
scheme" in the relevant conduct provisions set forth in Section 1B1.3, 
and that this definition should apply in the career offender context as 
well. We reject this argument, as the two provisions are designed to take 
different considerations into account and have different goals. See United 
States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1996) (relevant conduct 
definition of "common scheme or plan" is not binding on career offender 
determination); United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1024 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992) (Guidelines do not define "common 
scheme or plan" as it relates to application note 3 to Section 4A1.2). 
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common scheme or plan lies, logically enough, with the 
defendant who has access to that information. See United 
States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, 
the District Court afforded Beckett the opportunity to 
produce evidence that his prior robberies were part of a 
common scheme. This comes down to a question of fact, 
and we review the District Court's findings on this subject 
for clear error. See United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 
1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992). 
 
Beckett testified at his second sentencing hearing that he 
had planned the 1982 robberies and had made hoax bombs 
to carry them out at the same time. The District Court 
found that Beckett was not credible on this issue. 
 
       If the district court's account of the evidence is 
       plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, 
       the court of appeals may not reverse it even though 
       convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, 
       it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where 
       there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
       factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
       erroneous. 
 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573- 
74 (1985) (citations omitted). Moreover, where the District 
Court's findings are based on credibility determinations, the 
rule "demands even greater deference to the trial court's 
findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the 
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so 
heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what 
is said." Id. at 575. 
 
The District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 
Beckett offered only sparse details regarding his common 
plan, to the effect that he made two hoax bombs at the 
same time. Moreover, even assuming the truth of Beckett's 
assertions, "evidence of a plan simply to commit robberies 
when and as money is desired or needed cannot be enough 
by itself to permit the repeat robber to avoid being 
considered a career offender." Butler, 970 F.2d at 1024-25 
(citation omitted). If we discount or disregard Beckett's 
assertion of a common plan, there is no evidence of a single 
plan or scheme; the fact that the device and victim were 
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similar does not transmute two offenses into conduct 
undertaken pursuant to a common plan or scheme. We are 
satisfied that Beckett's two prior convictions were properly 
considered as separate felony convictions.3 The District 
Court therefore did not err by applying the career offender 




Next, Beckett argues that the District Court erred by 
failing to provide him with his rights of allocution. The 
District Court did afford Beckett the right of allocution at 
his first sentencing hearing. Beckett asserted his 
innocence, and argued the evidence from trial. The District 
Court only scheduled a second sentencing hearing because 
Beckett's first counsel had deprived him of the right to 
appeal by failing to file a notice of appeal within ten days 
of the first sentencing. Moreover, Beckett took the stand 
during the second sentencing hearing, where he was 
represented by new counsel, and he had every opportunity 
to address the District Court. 
 
Importantly, even were we to assume that Beckett was 
denied the right of allocution, we conclude that he was not 
prejudiced because the District Court departed downward 
from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 262-327 months, 
imposing a sentence of 180 months. In so holding we follow 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held in 
United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993), 
that although it was error to deny a defendant his right of 
allocution at sentencing, he suffered no prejudice because 
he was sentenced to the Guidelines minimum. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our decision in United States v. Hallman , 23 F.3d 821 (3d Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881 (1994), is not to the contrary. That case 
applied Section 4A1.2(a)(1), not (a)(2), to determine whether a prior 
conviction was part of the same offense for which the defendant was 
being sentenced. We held that the intent of the defendant at the time of 
the prior offense governed. Id. at 826 (citing United States v. Ali, 951 
F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir. 1992)). That reasoning supports our decision 
here. 
 





Beckett, the government, and we agree that the District 
Court erred by imposing restitution without determining 
Beckett's ability to pay. At the close of Beckett's second 
sentencing hearing, his new counsel requested that the 
District Court make specific findings concerning Beckett's 
ability to pay approximately $11,000 in restitution. The 
District Court declined, on the ground that it could adjust 
the restitution order after Beckett began to serve his term 
of supervised release, if necessary. 
 
The provisions of 18 U.S.C. S 3663 in effect at the time of 
Beckett's offenses required sentencing courts to make 
findings concerning a defendant's present and future ability 
to pay restitution. The District Court should have followed 
Section 3663 when it ordered restitution in this case, 
despite changes made to the law after Beckett committed 
the robberies. See United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 
92 (3d Cir. 1998) (ex post facto clause applies to Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996). We therefore remand for 




Beckett, the government, and we also agree that the 
District Court erred by sentencing him concurrently on 
both the charge of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(d), and on the lesser included offense of robbery 
under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). The District Court sentenced 
Beckett to 180 months on Counts One through Four. 
Count One charged the robbery of Home Unity Bank, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a); Count Two concerned the 
armed robbery of the same bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(d); Count Three involved the robbery of Fidelity 
Bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a); and Count Four 
referred to the armed robbery of Fidelity Bank in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d). 
 
The concurrent sentences imposed on Counts One and 
Three for the lesser included offenses of bank robbery 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Gov't of Virgin 
Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 668 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980). We will vacate the sentence 
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imposed on Counts One and Three, the lesser included 
offenses of bank robbery. Beckett's sentences for the 




Beckett's next argument is that the District Court 
committed reversible error by allowing the Assistant United 
States Attorney to refer to Beckett as a "repeat offender." 
Beckett also argues that his counsel's failure to object to 
this characterization demonstrates that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Beckett claims that this 
reference was made in "blatant disregard" of a pre-trial 
ruling by which the District Court excluded Beckett's 1982 
bank robbery convictions from trial evidence. 
 
This misconstrues the record. The Assistant United 
States Attorney said the following at the start of his opening 
statement: 
 
       This case is about a deja vu bank robber, a repeat 
       offender, a man who, within the span of three months, 
       robbed two banks in the same town, Bensalem, using 
       the exact same method, the exact same means. . . . 
       The only question before you, ladies and gentlemen, is 
       whether that man is the defendant, James Carroll 
       Beckett. 
 
This statement is not improper. The term "repeat offender" 
referred solely to the crimes under indictment. At trial, the 
government never mentioned Beckett's 1982 bank robbery 




Beckett contends that the District Court gave the jury an 
erroneous and confusing instruction that warrants reversal. 
He challenges the following instruction by the District 
Court to the jury: 
 
       Now, I wanted to talk to counsel because I think 
       something I said previously may have misled you, and 
       I didn't certainly intend to mislead you. You'll recall I 
       said that your verdict on any count doesn't control 
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       your verdict on any other count. In the context of this 
       case, that's not true. 
 
       And, the reason is that I've just told you that as to the 
       armed robbery counts, Counts 2 and Count 4 -- Count 
       2 and 4, that in Count 2 the Government must prove 
       beyond a reasonable doubt, first of all, that there was 
       a robbery. All the elements of that [are] charged in 
       Count 1. So, obviously, in Count 1 if you find that the 
       defendant did not commit the robbery alleged in Count 
       1 in the Home Unity Bank, then, obviously, you're not 
       called upon to determine whether he committed that 
       robbery as an armed robbery. And, in like manner, in 
       Count 3, if you should find that he did not commit the 
       robbery at the Fidelity Bank, well, then obviously in 
       Count 4, he didn't commit an armed robbery of Fidelity 
       Bank. 
 
       So, on the other hand, if you find that he did commit 
       the robbery in Count 1 at the Unity Bank, then you've 
       got to go on and decide did he also commit an armed 
       robbery at that bank in accordance with the law as I've 
       outlined to you. And, in like manner, if you find in 
       Count 3 that he committed the robbery at the Fidelity 
       Bank, then you must also go on and consider whether 
       he committed an armed robbery at the Fidelity Bank as 
       defined in my instructions to you. Is that satisfactory, 
       counsel? 
 
       Counsel for Beckett: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
Because Beckett did not object to this instruction at trial, 
we review it only for plain error. See United States v. Tobin, 
155 F.3d 636, 641 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1171 (1999). We hold that the District Court's instruction 
clearly instructed the jury that (1) it should acquit the 
defendant of armed robbery if it acquitted him of robbery; 
and (2) that it had to consider separately the evidence on 
armed robbery -- and determine whether the government 
had met all of the required elements -- even if it found 
Beckett guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery. This 
is not error. 
 




Next, Beckett believes his right to a speedy trial was 
violated because of the nine month delay between his arrest 
by local authorities for the Fidelity Bank robbery and his 
federal trial for both the Fidelity Bank and Home Unity 
Bank robberies. We disagree. 
 
The five year statute of limitations for non-capital federal 
offenses governs the time limit within which the federal 
government must bring an indictment for an offense. See 
18 U.S.C. S 3282. Here, the government brought the Home 
Unity Bank charges within one year of the robbery, and the 
Fidelity Bank charges within nine months. 
 
The federal Speedy Trial Act governs post-accusation 
periods of delay. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161. It requires the 
government to bring defendants to trial within 70 days of 
their indictment or first appearance before a judicial officer 
of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever date 
last occurs. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(c)(1). The delay between 
Beckett's federal arraignment on April 11, 1991, and the 
commencement of his jury trial on June 10, 1991, was 60 
days. This period is reduced to 35 days when permissible 
delay for the disposition of pre-trial motions is excluded. 
 
Beckett argues that the federal government nonetheless 
violated his Due Process rights by intentionally delaying its 
indictment for a period of six months after the Fidelity 
Bank robbery and his local arrest. He fails, however, to 
specify how he was prejudiced. 
 
Beckett can make out a claim under the Due Process 
Clause only if he can show both (1) that the delay between 
the crime and the federal indictment actually prejudiced his 
defense; and (2) that the government deliberately delayed 
bringing the indictment in order to obtain an improper 
tactical advantage or to harass him. See United States v. 
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90, 795-96 (1977); United 
States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988). 
 
Beckett has not shown either actual prejudice or 
improper delay. He does not, for instance, claim that items 
of evidence or documents were lost, witnesses became 
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unavailable, or that memories faded as the result of the six 
month delay. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
325-26 (1971) (appellee failed to demonstrate that 38 
month delay actually dimmed memories, made witnesses 
inaccessible, or caused evidence to be lost). 
 
Nor has he shown that the federal government delayed 
the indictment deliberately to harass him or to gain some 
improper advantage. The Due Process Clause does not 
require prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable 
cause exists, or even at the point where the government's 
investigation, though incomplete, has assembled sufficient 
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791-95. We see no evidence of 
improper delay while the federal government was building 
its case against Beckett regarding the robbery of the Home 





Beckett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against 
him regarding the charges of robbery and bank robbery, 
and believes that the District Court erred as a matter of law 
by allowing these verdicts to stand. We must sustain the 
verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the government, to uphold the jury's 
decision. See United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 17 
(1978)). We do not weigh evidence or determine the 
credibility of witnesses in making this determination. See 
Casper, 956 F.2d at 421. 
 
The evidence presented at trial, and described in our 
summary of the facts above, amply established that Beckett 
was the individual who robbed the Home Unity and Fidelity 
Banks. The evidence was both circumstantial and direct. 
There was clearly sufficient evidence on which a reasonable 




Finally, Beckett argues that the District Court erred by 
allowing the guilty verdict for armed robbery under 18 
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U.S.C. S 2113(d) to stand, when it was also allegedly not 
supported by the evidence. In this regard, Beckett argues 
that the government failed to establish that the hoax bombs 
were dangerous weapons. We disagree. 
 
Subsection 2113(a) of the bank robbery statute provides 
in pertinent part that: 
 
       Whoever, by force or violence, or by intimidation, takes 
       . . . from the person or presence of another . . . money 
       . . . belonging to . . . any bank . . . shall be . .. 
       imprisoned not more than twenty years. 
 
Subsection 2113(d) provides a five year increase in the 
maximum sentence for any person who, 
 
       in committing . . . any offense defined in subsections 
       (a) or (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts 
       in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a 
       dangerous weapon or device. . . . 
 
The District Court precluded the government from 
arguing that the "jeopardy" prong of Section 2113 applied 
in its closing. It instructed the jury only on the"assault" 
provision: 
 
       In order to sustain its burden of proof for the crime of 
       armed bank robbery as charged in Count 2 of the 
       indictment, the Government must first prove the three 
       elements to be proved for bank robbery, as already 
       stated. In addition, the Government must also prove 
       that the defendant deliberately assaulted the Home 
       Unity Savings Bank employees by the use of a 
       dangerous weapon or device while taking the money. 
       . . . 
 
       The term dangerous weapon or device means any 
       object that can be used by one person to inflict severe 
       bodily harm or injury upon another person. The 
       weapon or device need not actually be capable of 
       inflicting severe bodily harm or injury upon another to 
       be dangerous, rather, a weapon or device may be 
       considered to be dangerous if it instills fear in the 
       average citizen creating an immediate danger that a 
       violent response will follow. 
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The District Court's instructions accurately explained the 
elements of the assault prong of Section 2113(d). See 
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-12 n.6 (1978) 
(phrase "by the use of a dangerous weapon or device" 
modifies both "assault" and "jeopardy" provisions of 
subsection (d) regardless of the comma that followed the 
term "assaults any person"). 
 
The instructions also accurately explained that"[t]he 
weapon or device need not actually be capable of inflicting 
severe bodily harm or injury upon another to be dangerous, 
rather, a weapon or device may be considered to be 
dangerous if it instills fear in the average citizen creating an 
immediate danger that a violent response will follow." 
 In McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16 (1986), the 
Supreme Court held that an unloaded gun is a "dangerous 
weapon" as that term is used in Section 2113(d). The Court 
rested its holding on three conclusions, each of which, the 
Court held, was independently sufficient: 
 
       First, a gun is an article that is typically and 
       characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is 
       manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, and the 
       law reasonably may presume that such an article is 
       always dangerous even though it may not be armed at 
       a particular time or place. In addition, the display of a 
       gun instills fear in the average citizen; as a 
       consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a 
       violent response will ensue. Finally, a gun can cause 
       harm when used as a bludgeon. 
 
Id. at 17. 
 
The bombs, although they turned out to be fakes, would 
reasonably have instilled fear in an average citizen, thereby 
creating an immediate danger that a violent response would 
ensue. They did instill such fear in this case. The Home 
Unity hoax bomb had an antenna and a light. The victim 
teller cried after the robber left. Detectives responding to 
both robberies called the Bomb Squad, causing the 
evacuation of numerous people from the buildings. The 
Bomb Squad used a robot to remove and destroy both hoax 
bombs. Clearly, they instilled fear in all those who saw 
them, and provoked a police response. They therefore 
 
                                19 
 
 
qualify as dangerous weapons under Section 2113(d). See 
United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 882-83 (4th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 825 (1995) (a"fake bomb, as 
a matter of law, may constitute a dangerous weapon[under 
S 2113(d)], regardless of its actual capabilities, when a 
victim confronted with it is placed in reasonable expectation 
of danger") (quoting United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 




In summary, we will reverse and remand for factual 
findings on the question of Beckett's ability to pay 
restitution. We will vacate the sentence imposed as to the 
lesser included offenses of bank robbery, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(a), charged in Counts One and Three of the 
indictment of March 26, 1991. We will affirm the District 
Court as to all other issues. 
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